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CONTROL OF PROPERTY BY THE DEAD.
Although in spite of us death is our inevitable goal, mct
of us feel a strong desire to continue to exert an influence on
the affairs of the world we leave behind. Ve want to keep alive
the race, the family, the name, through the years to come. We
do not want to be forgotten. We do not want to be like a finger
thrust into a bowl of water, which, when the finger is with-
drawn, soon shows a surface as unruffled as before the finger
touched it.
We have, not as frequently perhaps, but very commonly, a
similar feeling about our property. Our goods, if we are so
fortunate as to have any, are not interred with our-bones, but
are left behind for others to enjoy.' But we like to determine
who shall enjoy them and how they-shall be enjoyed. Shall we
not do as Ive wish with our own?
But this world with its good, or at least its material, things
is a world for the living and not for the dead. It would not be
the part of wisdom to allow the living, in their enjoyment of
property, to be unduly trammeled by the wishes of the dead. To
allow to the owner of property the greatest power of directing
its disposition on his death and after his death is not in truth the
highest ideal of civilized society. The welfare of society demands
that the law should set limits to the power of thehand of the dead
to control human affairs.
If the owner of property dies intestate the law in all civil-
ized countries allows the property, or at least as much of it as the
state does not itself take, to pass to certain persons connected
with the owner by blood, marriage, or adoption. Naturally the
laws of different countries differ as to who those relatives
shall be.2 Under the feudal system, in which the military and
in large part the political establishment was based upon tenure
, Here our practice differs from that of primitive societies, like those
of the Fiii Islanders and the aboriginal Australians. Letourneau, Property,
Its Origin and Development, 319-320.
'See Maine, Early Law and Custom, Chap. 4. For the law of inheri-
tance among various primitive peoples. see Letourneau, Property. Its Origin
and Development, Chap. XVIII.
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of land. tile eldest son of the decedlnt was preferred to his other
children, and sons took precedeice over daughters.3  In England,
where the feudal svsteni struck its deepest roots,4 where the
gvernincnt continued for so long a time and so largely in the
hands of a landed aristocracy, and -where the law as to land is
peculiarly conservative, the law of primogeniture still persists.'
In several of the American colonies primogeniture prevailed prior
to the Revolution; in several, the eldest son was given a double
portion. But within a short time after the Revolution these rules
had given way to tile principle of equal listribution,G which
already prevailed in England in the case of chattels.7
Tli E EsTAMENI:ARY POWER.
But tile law in England and in this country, as in all civil-
ized countries, goes further than merely to allow the relatives
of the decedent to succeed to his property. It permits the owner
of property before his ldeath to designate the recipients of his
property, or at least of a part of it. We are so accustomed to
the right of testamentary disposition that we seldom pause to
consider what all extraordinary power it confers upon the owner
of property. "The power of free testamentary disposition,"
says Sir Henry Maine. " "implies the greatest latitude ever given
in the history of the world to the volition or caprice of the
individual." " But the right of testamentary disposition is never
absolute. .\ll systems of law place some restrictions .upon the
volition and caprice of the individual, some limitations upon the
On the history and function of the law of primogeniture. see Pollock
& Maitland. History of English Law (2d Ed.), 11, .6o-313; Maine, Ancient
Law. 227-243.
' Pollock & 'Maitland. I listory of English Law t2d Ed.), 11, 265.
'See the Inheritance Act (833), 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. io6: Land Transfer
Act (1847), 6o & 6i Vict, c. 65.
'4 Kent, Commentaries. 35.
'Statutes of Distributions. 22 & 23 Car. II. c. to t t67I), and i Jac. II.
c. 17 (i(S-5). For the law as to intstate succes-ion1 prior to those statutes.
see 'ollock & Maitland. Ilitory of .ngli-h Law .!d Ed.). 11, 36--63.
'Village Communities. p. 42.
'For an account of the origin of the right of testamentary di~.position,
-ee Maine, Ancient Law, Lhap3. VI, VII.
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power of the owner of property to determine who shall enjoy it
and to control the disposition and use of it after he is dead.
SELECTIO-N OF BENEFICIARIES.
The history of Engli.h testamentary law shows a constantly
expanding power of testamentary disposition. At common law
freehold estates in land could not Le disposed of by will." But
the desire of the holder of property to control its disposition on
his death would not be denied. Ile would transfer his estate to
others to hold to his use, and the use or beneficial interest so
created could be devised: or he might transfer to others to hold
to uses to be declared by his will. When the Statute of Uses t
turned uses into legal titles, the Statute of Wills was soon passed,
empowering a tenant in fee simple to devise his estate "at his
free will and pleasure." r' .\lthough the Statute of Wills enabled
a tenant in fee simple to disinherit his heir, yet if he left a widow
he could not prevent her from claiming her dower in all land of
which he was seised at any time during coverture. But this
restraint, it was held, could be evaded if the testator bad had
the foresight to take an equitable instead of a legal estate.13
The claim of the widow to dower in equitable estates is now
allowed in England by statute."4  But this statute allows the
husband by deed or by will to deprive her of her dower in both
legal and equitable estates. A husband's claim to curtesy in
equitable as well as legal estates was recognized without the aid
of any statute; but in England today a married woman may by
disposing of her land by deed or by will bar her husband's right
3"l-eake, Property in Land (2d I-d.). 48. Conveyances of land inhk
vivos were allowed in j-85 by the Statute Quia Emptores, i8 Ed. I, st. 1,
C. 1.
"27 Hen. VIII, c: to (1535).
1232 lien. V111, c. 1 (1540). ut it would seem that after the enact-
ment of the Statute of L:e., and i,efjre the enacttment of the Statute of
Wills the tenant could practically dcvi.e his estate by a feoffmcnt to the
use of such person as he should by will appoint. See Bacon, Reading on
the Statute of Uses, Rowe's Ed., n. go.
"Bottomley v. Lord Fairfax. Prec. Ch. 336; Ames, Cases on Trusts
(2d Ed.), 375.
"Dower Act t 1833), 3 & 4 Will. IV, C. 105.
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of curtesy. 13  As to chattels, it was the law in England in early
times that the wife and children of the owner had claims to their
"reasonable parts" which could not be defeated by testamentary
disposition. If there were no children, the widow was entitled
to a half; if there were children, she was entitled to a third and.
they to another third. But these restrictions on the power of
testamentary disposition of chattels disappeared 'very generally
in England early in the fourteenth century. 16 The English law
today allows the owner of real or personal property to dispose
of it on his death without iny regard to the welfare of his wife
or children; it gives a testator greater freedom in this respect
than does any other civilized country.1
In the United States the surviving wife or husband is given
some kind of interest in the estate which cannot be defeated by
will. In many of the states the common law rights of dower
and curtesy still persist. And there are generally, though not
universally Is statutes which give the widow an interest in her
husband's equitable estates in land.19 In some of the states the
right of the surviving spouse in land is considerably larger than
IMarried Women's Property Act ( 1882), 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75-.
Pollock & Maitland. History of English Law (2d Ed.). 11, I 48-3s5
tloldsworth. History of English Law, 11I, 436. In some parts of England
the restrictions lasted much longer.
"See Sohm. Institutes of Roman Law. Ledlie's trans., Sec. 113: Civil
Code of .\rgentina. Arts. 3591 if: Belgian Civil Code. Arts. 913 if; French
tiil ,adle. Arts. o,-4qi6: German Code. Art. 23t3: Italian Civil Code.
.\rts. ki: if: Civil Code of Japan, Arts. 113o if; Spanish Civil Code, Arts.
8o6 if Swisb Civil Code, Sees. 47o-40. Bell. Principles of the Law of
Scotland. Bk. Ill. Part 1. c. l: Tyabji. Principles of Muhammadan Law.
Sec. ;g. In South Africa and Quebec the restrictions derived from the
Roman law have yielded to the English principle of freedom of testa-
mentary disposition. Nathan, Common Law of South Africa, Sec. 1811:
Juta, Law of Wills in South Africa, x; Stat. x4, Geo. III, c. 83, Sec. 1o
(1774); Laws Lower Canada, 41 Geo. Ill, c. 4 (18o).
"See Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5, 7.
"i Stimson. Amer. Stat. Law. Sec. 3212. In some of the states she
has an intere.-t in equitable estates only when the husband was beneficially
entitled on his death. See for example. Rev. Stat. Neb. (1913), Sec. 1-65:-
Ohio Gen. Code (191o), Sec. 86o6; Code of Tenn. (1896), Sec. 4139. In
others she has an interest when he was beneficially entitled at any time
during coverture. See for example, Hurd's Rev. Stat. 11. (1915-1916). c.
41. Sec. I: Gen. Stat. Kan. (19i9), Sec. .'oj2: Rev. Stat. Mo. (9og). Sec.
345: 2 Comp. Stat. N. J. (19o). p. -v43; Gen. Laws R. I. (i9o9), p. 1195;
Comp. Laws Utah (1907), Sec. 28.
CONTROL OF PROPERTY BY THE DEAD
the common law right of dower or curtesy; 20 and in some the
surviving spouse has an indefeasible right to a share of personal
as well as of real property.2  Children and other relatives are
generally given little if any protection. In Louisiana, it is true,
the children and the parents of the testator are given the ample
protection afforded by the civil law.22  In Texas at one time a
parent was forbidden to deprive his children of more than one-
fourth of his estate; but this restriction was subsequently re-
moved.3 In some states statutes give the minor children of the
decedent. as well as his widow, a right in the homestead which
cannot be defeated by his will.24  In some states there are stat-
utes which provide for an allowance f6r the temporary support
of the widow and of the minor children of the testator which
cannot be defeated by him. - There are quite generally statutes
which allow a testator's children who are not provided for in his
will to receive the shares which they would receive if he died
intestate, unless an intention to exclude them is affirmatively
shown by the will or in some states by other evidence; in some
states posthumnous children, and in others any child born after
the execution of the will cannot be entirely excluded.2  In the
United States, therefore, a small measure of protection is given
to the children of the testator, and a considerably larger protec-
' See for example, Code Iowa (1897). Sec. 33.66: Gen. Stat. Minn.
(0913), Sec. 7238 Rev. Stat. Neb. (1913), Sec. 1265; Comp. Laws Utah
(9o7), Secs. 2731. 2826.
7 See for example. Hurds Rev. Stat. Ill. (i9t5-i9i6), C. 4!. Sec. 12;
Gen. Stat. Kan. (19)), Sees. 9811-98J2: Mass. R. L (19o2), c. 135. Sec.
16: Gen. Stat. Minn. (1913), Sec. 7243; Rev. Stat. Mo. (19o9), Secs. 349-353;
Ohio Gen. Code 1910), Sec. xo.566. In states in which the institution of
community ownership is recognized, one spouse cannot dispose of more
than his or her own share of community property.
mCiv. Code La., -Art. 1493.
See Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173.
See for example, Gen. Stat. Kan. (199)), Sees. 2935-294o; Gen. Stat.
,Minn. (1913). Sec. 7237; Civil Code N. D., Sec. 5627; Ohio Gen. Code
(1910), Sec. 11,732.
'See Code Iowa (897). Sec. 3314: Gen. Stat. Minn. (1913), Sec. 7243;
Rev. Stat. Neb. (1913). Sec. 1267: New Me'c. Stat. (1s), See. 5893; Ohio
Gen. Code (t91o), Sec. io,6_6. See also Cal. Code Civ. Proc., Sees. 1465-
1469.
:*See a full collection of the statutes in Warren, Cases on Wills and
Administration, 284-285.
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tion to his widow. Doubtless. the rea .on why in the United
States it has been found necessary to give a greater protection
to the widow and children than that which is given in England
today is that in England marriage settlements are common, at
least among the well-to-do (and the English law of property is
and always has been chiefl- concerned with the upper and upper
middle classes) and afford the necessary protection: but in the
United States such settlements are not common.. But even in
the United States there is a far greater freedom of testamentary
disposition than in most of the countries of the world.
There are. however, certain classes of persons who find it
peculiarly easy to insinuate themselves into the good graces of
a testator or to play upon his fears. and to secure perhaps a share,
perhaps the whole of his estate: so that it has sometimes been-
felt necessary for the law to intervene for the protection of his
wife and children and other relatives. and to impose limitations
on his testamentary power. This has happened chiefly in the
case of the objects (and results ) of the testator's illicit affections,
and of the objects of his charitable zeal.
In South Carolina a man cannot devise or bequeath to his
mistress and bastard children more than one-fourth of his
estate."'7  This restriction cannot he successfully evaded by the
creation of a secret trust. "s So also. in Louisiana. it is provided
that those who have lived together in open concubinage and
who do not afterwards marry are incapable of making to each
other, whether inter 'ivos or inortis causa, any donation of
itnimovables: and if they make a donation bf movables, it cannot
exceed one-tenth of the whole value of their estate.*. There is
a provision also forbidding donations to illegitimate children
beyond what is necessary to procure them sustenance or an occu-
pation or profession. if the donor or testator or testatrix leaves
legitimate children ,r descendants. " '' But in England and in most
"Code S. C. (i912). Sec. 3575. There i- a similar provision as to
traiisfers inter 'i-'es. Code S. C. (mi912. Sec. 3414.
= Gore Y. Clark. 37 S. C. 537.
-'iv. Code La.. Art. 1481.
-Ctiv. C ude La_ Art. 148.3.
COXTROL OF PROPERTY B" THE DEAD
of the states a nman may, if it pleases him, leave all the property
over which he has the power )f testamentary disposition to his
mistress and illegitimate children: and it is generally held that
although the illicit relationship may be shown as evidence of
undue influence or even of lack of testamentary capacity, it does
not raise a presumption of undue influence or lack of testa-
mentary capacity; much less does it make the disposition illegal.,
\gain, there are restrictions on the power of devising or
bequeathing property for charitable purposes. To many persons
the idea of a generosity which involves no personal sacrifice is
irresistibly appealing. "Defer not charities till death." said
Bacon. who himself bequeathed his property to found lecture-
ships in the universities. but who died insolvent.32 "for, certainly,
if a nian weigh it rightly, he that doth so is rather liberal of
another man's than of his own.*' ': * In order to restrain the undue
dishersion of heirs and disappointment of expectant relatives and
friends. : - and to restrain the taking of lands out of commerce,
and perhaps in particular to curb the church,34 the law has
imposed limitations upon the power of disposing of .property for
charitable purposes by will or by a conveyance executed shortly
before death. The Statute of Mortmain, '  or as it .may perhaps
nore properly be called, the Charitable Uses Act," ' provided that
no land or property to be laid out in land should be given to
charitable uses by will. and it also forbade gifts inter vivos for
charitable purposes unless made by deed executed at least twelve
montls and enrolled in chancery at least six months before the
death of the donor. But the act met with much criticism; , and
.\Arnault v. Anhault. N. J. Eq. 14)1. But of course juries are much
more apt to find undue influence or want of testamentary capacity in tile
case of an "unnatural" than in the case of a "natural" disposition. As a
practical matter this affurd a real, though extra-legal, restraint on the
caprice of testators.
"Campliell: Live.s (if the Lord Chancellors. 11, 421. 430.
Bacon's Works. VI. 462. See I lobhoue. The Dead land, preface. xii.
See Jeffrics v. Alexander. 8 II. L C. 9-t 646-7.
'riztowve. Mortmnain and Charitable Uses Act (1891), 3-6.
-f c.o 1f. c. 36 (1,6).
'See Luckraft v. Pridham, 6 Ch. D. -'O5, 214.
"Bri.towe. Mortmain and Charitable U.es Act (i8om), 17-i8.
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by the present English law 38 land may be devised for charitable
purposes, but the land must be sold within a year after the testa-
tor's death unless the court or the charity commissioners author-
ize its retention, when it is required for the actual occupation of
the charity. Thus in England today there is no longer a restric-
tion on the power of the testator to exclude his heir in favor of
a charity.
The Charitable Uses Act did not apply to the American
colonies. A similar provincial statute of the province of Massa-
chusetts Bay was repealed immediately after the American Revo-
lution. 9 In some of the states there are, however, statutes limit-
ing the power of making a testamentary disposition for char-
itable purposes. These siatutes make no distinction between land
and personalty, and their purpose is the protection of heirs and
not the prevention of the taking of property out of commerce.
Thus it is provided in some states that no devise or bequest for
a charitable purpose shall be good unless the will is executed
within a certain time before the death of the testator.40  In some
states there are statutes which limit the amount which can be
devised or bequeathed for charitable purposes.
4'
' ortmain and Charitable Uses Act (i89i), 4 & 55 Vict., c. 73, See. s-
'Odell v. Odell. to Allen (Mass.) t.
"Cal. Civ. Code (ig9S), Sec. 1313 (3o days); Park, Ann. Code Ga.
(1914). Sec. 385 (go days); Revised Code Mont. (90o7). Sees. 4761-4762
(3o days): Ohio Gen. Code (191o), Sec. o.5o4 (one year if testator leaves
issue or adopted child) : Purdon's Dig. Pa. (i3th Ed.). p. 5i-"9 (one month.
applying also to transfers inter vivos). See Stat. 7 & 8 Vict., c. 97, Sec. z6
(Ireland). A similar statutory provision in New York has been repealed.
N. Y. Laws (1911). c. 857. These statutes impose limitations on the right
of the testator to devise or bequeath, and only his heir or next of kin
or widow can take advantage of them. Trustees of State University v.
Folsom, 56 Ohio St. 7o.
, Cal. Civ. Code (1915), Sec. 1313 (one-third if testator leaves legal
heirs); Park, Ann. Code Ga. (1914), Sec. 385 (one-third if testator leaves
wife or descendant): Iowa Code (1897), Sec. 3270 (one-fourth if testator
leaves spouse, child or parent) ; Revised Code Mont. (i9o7). See. 4761
(one-third if testator leaves legal heirs) ; N. Y. "Consol. Laws (19o9). De-
cedent Estate Law. Sec. 17 (one-half if testator leaves spouse, child or
parent). These statutes impose limitations on the right of the testator to
devise or bequeath and not on the right of the devisee or legatee to take.
lence they have no applicability to bequests by a resident of a state which
has no such statute to a charitable corporation of a state which has such a,
statute. Iltaly v. Reed, 153./MIass. 197.
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Except for such restrictions as these and such restrictions
as may be imposed upon the capacity of the devisee or legatee
to take or hold property, as in the case of corporations, aliens,
monks, as to which, however, the restrictions have been largely
though not entirely removed, the testator is free to leave his
property to any one he may. choose. The undeserving, the
unworthy character of the person selected is immaterial. The
testator's choice may be whimsical, it may be unjust, it may be
unnatural, but it will be effective, provided the disposition was
not induced by fraud or undue influence or other wrongful means
and provided the testator did not lack testamentary capacity.42
It is felt that it would be unwise to attempt to limit the power
of the owner to select the objects of his bounty, and that it would
be a hopeless task to determine in each instance whether the
testator had acted wisely or foolishly in his choice of bene-
ficiaries.
43
NATURE OF DISPOSITION.
The testator's caprice or whim is given wide scope in-which
to operate, not only in respect to the selection of the objects of
his bounty, but also in respect to the nature of the disposition of
his property. In order to accomplish his purposes he may em-
ploy the device of a condition, precedent or subsequent, or a con-
ditional limitation; or he may employ the device of a trust or
power.
A. Conditions and conditional limitations. A testator may
give a legal or equitable estate or interest to continue until the
happening of ! cerfin ercent; or he may provide that on the hap-
pening of such an event the estate or interest of the devisee or
legatee shall cease, and the property or the beneficial interest in
the property shall pass to the testator's heir or next of kin or.shall
go over to some other person."4  Now eccentric testators have
12See Breadheft v. Cleveland. iio X. E. 662 (Ind. 1915); Meier v.
Buchter, 197 Mo. 68; Arnault Y. Arnault, 52 X . J. Eq. 8o.
' As a practical matter, of course, a restraint is imposed by the readi-
ness of jurors to find undue influcnce or lack of testamentary capacity
where the disposition is foolish.
"Professor Gray was of the opinion that determinable fees are ren-
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chosen all sorts of peculiar events as those on the happening of
which the legal or equitable interest in property left by them is to
change hands. The comic opera uncle, with his pl,it-prolucing
bequests, is not unknown either in England or in this country.
The mere fact. however, that the event is capriciously selected
does not invalidate the disposition.- The law does not forbid
capricious or whimsical conditions or limitations or trusts, liro-
vided the testator does not cross that somewhat indistinct line
which separates dispositions which are illegal or immoral or con-
trary to public policy from those which are merely foolish or
absurd.
The decision in an early New York case 4., is interesting in
this connection. The testator devised his interest in a piece of
wood-land to all his children "in case the aine continue to inhabit
the town of Hurley, otherwise not." One of the devisees never
resided within the town, but it was held that he took an interest
in the property which on his death passed to his heirs. The
court, in speaking of the condition, said:
"It is too -absurd and unreasonable to be countenanced. It is
absurd for any man to compel all his children to live in a small
country village, as the condition of enjoying a piece of wood-land
lying there. A thousand better situations might offer for obtaining a
livelihood, or being useful to the public. and when from caprice, or
any other motive, choice in this respect, which ought to be free, is
denied them, courts ought not to he very solicitious to enforce a
direction, which, to say the least of it. betrays more of a whimsi-
cal disposition in the testator, than of that sound sense and under-
standing which he professes to have enjoyed when lie made his
Will." 46
But the cases generally do not go as far as.this.- Conditions
as to residence in a particular place or house, if sufficiently defi-
dered invalid by the Statute Quia Emptores. but the cases have generally
held otherwise. Gray. Rule against Perpetuities .3( Ed.), Sees. 3t-41a.
Certainly that statute does not prevent the attaching of a condition subse-
quent to a fee simple (Op. cir. Sec. 30). and of course that statute has no
application to conditional limitations (Op. cii., Sec. 32). nor to equitable
interests.
SXNewkerk v. Xewkerk. 2 Caines (N. Y.), 345.
'he court was also of the opinion that the condition was void for
uncertainty. and that there was no onue uht could take on the breach of
the condition, as the devisees were also heiri and there was no gift over
except of the reidue. On the mnatter of tro i..ions in, te'rrarant, see Wheeler
v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 364: 6 Gray. Cases on Property (2d Ed.1, 32. 33.
CONTROL OF PROPERTY B)" THlE DE.AD
nite, are upheld.4 7  So also the courts have upheld conditions as
to change of namie." and conditions as to the pursuit of certain
studies. 4 ' or the following of a certain trade or professionao and
conditions as to abstinence from the use of liquor or tobacco or
front card-playing." So also a testator may attach to a legacy
-t condition that the legatee 4htuld build or repair a monument." 2
lie may make a hequest to a church conditional upon
the minister's wearing a black gown in the pulpit.3 or upon the
continuance of its present pastor in office for a certain time.
4
Although conditions like these may be arbitrary, or even foolish.
they are not contrary to any public policy.
B. Trusis snd powser. For the accomplishment of his
purpose a testator may wish to employ the device of a trust in-
stead of a condition or c,,:bliuioiil limitation. Ilere. however.
be is met with a difficulv. .\ valid trust cannot be created
'Dunne v. Dnnne. 3 Sin. & Gif. (devise of land with a condition
that devisees 4huuld re-ide in the man-ion honie kl the land): Clavering
V. Ellison, 7 1. L C. ;o7 gift over if devi'ee should he educated abroad);
In re Crumnpe (om2). I 1. R. .is' tboue.,t (if anmnuity to cease if annitant
should return to Ireland. Fngl:tnd or Scotland) Iowe v. Cloud. 45 Ga.
481 ( land devi.ed provided the de',isee "c,*ne and live on it"): Conge; V.
Lowe, 124 Ind. 368 (gift (f land to one for life "proided he will live oi
and occupy same") : Pearl v. l.,ckwciod. 123 'Mich. 1.t2 tlegacy to nephew
"if he continue to live with in-- family md on my estate until he shall
arrive at the age of 21 years and lahor as faithfully as he has labored for
me"). A-, to tile effect of the Settled Land Act IS2). see /i re Paget's
Settled Estates, 30 Ch. D. 161. See also Jarman. Wills (6th Ed.), pp.
i.46-1548; and the cases cited in a note to Casper v. Walker, 33 N. J.
Eq. 35.
" Davies v. Lowndes, 2 Scott. 71: Smith v. Smith. 64 Neb. 563; Merrill
v. Wisconsin Female College. 74 Wis. 415 (change of name of college).
See it re Jackson's Will. 2o X. Y. Supp. 3o (legacy to Thaddeus J. Boyd,
"provided lie wvill write hitz name in all future time, T. Jackson Boyd").
Compare Musgrave v. Brooke. 26 Ch. 1). 7qa: Taylor v. Mason. 9 Wheat
(U. S.) 325. See Jarmai. Will, (6th Ed.). pp. 1542-1546, as to "name
and arms" clause.
"Shepard v. Shepard. ;7 Conn. 24.
'Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366.
'I Markham v. Hufford. t23 Mich. Hos: lawke v. Enyart. -w Neb. 149;
Dustan v. Dustan. x Paige MN. Y.J 5oo: Onderdonk v. OnderdoAk. 12
N. V. io6: Cushman v. Culchman. 116 N. Y. App. Div. -63, affivnrd 1
X. Y. 5o: Webster v.. Morri. 66 Wis. 366: Jordan v. lumn, ;3 Ont. --67.
Somtimet the condition fails for uncertainty. Jonez v. lones. 223 Mo. 424.
uSee lit re Tyler (1891) 3 Ch. 252.
'li re Robinson I 102).. Cih. 95.
" Caw v. Robertson, 5 X. Y. t2:,.
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unless there is some one to enforce it. A charitable
trust can be enforced by the attorney-general. 'But a trust
for a non-charitable purpose can be enforced only by the
beneficiary; and if there is no definite beneficiary it
cannot be enforced at all. In the leading case of Morice v.
Bishop of Durhlam'' a testatrix bequeathed all her estate to the
Bishop of Durham upon trust to pay her debts and certain lega-
cies and "to dispose of the ultimate residue to such objects of
benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own
discretion shall most approve of." It was held that although
the bishop was ready-and willing to carry out the wishes of the
testatrix, he should not be allowed to do so and that the next of
kin were immediately and .unconditionally entitled to the residue.
The scope of the purpose of the testatrix was too broad to be
held charitable. Hence the purpose of the testatrix could not be
enforced by the attorney general. And no one else had a stand-
ing to enforce it. What, then, should be done with the property?
Conceivably the bishop might be allowed to keep it. But equity
sternly repels the claim of any one to keep property to which it
was intended that he should take only the legal and not the bene-
ficial title. The question then arises whether the bishop should
be allowed to perform if he is willing to do so. There is nothing
illogical in allowing him to perform, although he cannot be com-
pelled to do so; there is nothing unreasonable. in holding that
there is not an immediate and unconditional resulting trust for
the next of kin, but that there is a resulting trust for them subject
to a condition precedent of the failure of the bishop to perform.
There would be no practical difficulty in dealing with the situa-
tion; it would be perfectly possible for a court of equity at the
suit of the next of kin to decree that the bishop should hand over
the property to the next of kin unless within a reasonable time
he should carry out the purpose-of the testatrix. Thus to dispose
of the matter would certainly morb nearly accomplish the inten-
tion of the testatrix than to compel the trustee to hand over the
property to the next of kin regardless of his willingness to per-
a o Ves. 521.
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form. This was the earnest contention of Professor Ames,56
but the authorities are all against him.
There are other cases similar to Morice v. Bishop of Dur-
ham in that there is no one who can enforce the purpose of
the testator, but different in one respect, namely, that that pur-
pose is definite. Such, for example, are bequests for the saying
of masses for the soul of the testator or of other designated
persons, where such bequests are not regarded on the one hand
as charitable,5" nor on the other hand as illegal,", which have
sometimes been upheld. " ' Such also are bequests for the erec-
tion or care of a tomb or monument, which have sometimes been
upheld.(" Such also were bequests of slaves with a direction for
their emancipation, 'where such bequests were not enforceable
by the slave, nor charitable nor illegal, which were sometimes
upheld. 61 Such also are bequests for the care of certain definite
animals, which have been upheld.62
The Failure of the Tilden Trust, 5 Harv. L Rev. 389.
'As in O'Hanlon v. Logue (19o6). I 1. R. 247: Hoeffer v. Clogan. 171
Ill. 462; Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402; Ackerman v. Fichter, 1,9 Ind. 4o (all
poor souls); Schouler, Petitioner, 134 Mass. 426; Webster v. Sughrow, 69
N. H. 38o; Kerrigan v. Tabb, 39 AtL 7o1 (N. J.); Seibert's Appeal, 18
NV. N. (Pa.) 276.
"As in England. West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Myl. & K. 684. See post n.
102.
5Reichenbach v. Quin, 21 L. R. Ir. 138; In re Lemmon's Estate. 152
Cal. 377; Moran v. Moran, 104 Iowa 216; Coleman v. O'Leary's Exr., 114
Ky. 388; Sherman v. Baker, 2o R. I. 446: Re Zeagman, 37 Ont. L. Rep. 536.
The opposite result was reached in Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholio
Church of Mobile. io4 Ala. .327; Holland v. Alcock. 1o8 X. Y. 312: McHugh
v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, x8i. See a collection of cases in 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 96.
" Mussett v. Bingle (1876). V. N. i7o; Ames. Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.).
201, n. 2. The opposite result was reached in M'Caig v. University of
Glasgow (9o7). S. C. 2.31. See a collection of cases in i British Ruling
Cases, 9.31. If the bequest is for the erection of a monument to the
testator himself it may be regarded as a funeral expense; and if of a
monument in a church or churchyard or for a public character, it may be
regarded as a charitable trust. In re Barker. 25 T. L. R. 753. Some states
have statutes upholding bequests for the erection or maintenance of monu-
ments. and for the care of burial lots. See for example. Hurd's Rev.
Stat. Ill. (1915-1916). c. 21, Sec. 5,; Mass. R. L. isoo). c. 78. See. 24,
C. 113. Sec. 42; -%. Y. Consol. Laws (i09). Personal Property Law, Sec.
13a; Ohio Gen. Code (igio), Sec. io,1o.
"Ross v. Duncan, Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 587; Ames, Cases on Trusts
(2d Ed.). 213 n.
"In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552. A bequest for the care of. an indefinite
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Are such dispositions inivali(? .\re they for any reason
against public policy ? Professor Gray argued ,'a that in all these
cases the testator is attempting to "create a legal duty without
a legal right." That is true: the testator intends to imposeI an
obligation on the legatee: and he fails in this because there is no
one who has a right to enforcte eobligation. But is there any
oljection to making the acci-imllihnent of the testator's purpose
depend on the willingness of the legatee to perfouml? Professor
Gray argued that the law N\ ill llot allow a man -to create a situa-
tion where the legal title is ill .\ and the beneficial interest in no
OIne." Bit i, this really the law? The testator could hlaveaccum-
plished the desired result by yiVintg a power to appOint for the
desired Iurpotse: he could have accomplished neavl" the same
re-ult by making a bequest- conditional up,on the fulfillment of
the desired purpose. '" There seenis to he no reason, therefore,
why attempted trusts for these purposes should be regarded as
against public policy One is always inclined to doubt the sound-
ness of an argument that a dispOsition is against public policy
when the same result accomplished in a different way is not
against public policy. If they fail it is because of a purely tech-
nical rule which defeats the intention of the testator.
The case of Moric' v. Bishop of lurlzin might be differ-
entiated from the cases in which the gift is fur a definite purpose.
on the ground that the testator has no right to make a gift, the
effect of which is practically to delegate to another the power
ito make his will for him after he is dead. '  But there seems to
number of animals is charitable. In re Wcdgwood 1101.). 1 Clh. T13. Minns
v. Billings, z83 Mass. 1,6.
-Gifts for a Xon-Charitable Purpose. i; tlarv. L. Rev. 5o.
"in re Tyler 1,.84), 3 Ch. 232.
The Loui~iana Code. .\rticl 1573. provides that "The custom of willing
bty testament, by the intervention ot a conuns.ary or attorney in fact
is abolished. Thus the institution of heir and all other testamentary dis-
J).,itions committed to the choice oi a third pserson are nllUl. even should
that choice have b.en limited to a number of Persons designated by the
testator." This article applies to bequests for charitahle purposes. Suc-
cessioi of McCloskey, 52 La. .\nn. i212. In Xe - Mexico, on the contrary, it
is provided by statute (X. MNlx.-Stat. ltw.s]. Sec. * " 91. that "Any person
capable of making a will may onjuom\er and authorize any other intelli-
genit and well-qualified person to make his last will and testament and dis-
pose of his property."
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he iotthing ,,lp,,,.ell to public policy in such a disposition. It is
assuned even by" thise who support the case that if the testator
had employed tile machinery of all optional power of apppoint-
ment in favor (if any iperson in the world except the donce, it
woul lie good.''" And vet the creation ot such a power would
accompli.h tle same result as that which would follow from
allowing the l)ishop to perform the attempted trust if Ire were
willing."
There is (,ne very imprtant class of cases of non-charitable
trusts in which there is no definite hcneficiary. namely, trusts for
tiincorl)orated clubs and societies. Professor Gra" felt logically
driven t) contend that such trusts :houhl fail unless their creator
intended to confer the cntire beneficial interest upon thle persons
who are members of the club or society at the time of the crea-
tion of the trust." lut such a result seens peculiarv shocking.
Professor Maitland in his lucid and entertaining way has shown
how unincorporated ass ,ciations, through the aid of the law of
trusts, have won their place in the sun and grown and flour-
ished. :'; Public policy has not been violated by their develop-
ment. A more severe blow could not 'he struck against them
than to deny then the right to enjoy at least a beneficial interest
'°"The Ci'lllmol ax\ a-lh.,% p'ttrty to ipass front ''e person to an-
other on any future coltingency I proxided it is not too remote) and
the ct,:niiingecy ttzy lie :t t. muil atilw a third permotm." Gray. 15 Ilarv.
L. Rev. 512. But see Norris v. Tholnson, to N. J. Eq. 307.
'" lrofe.-or '\ht's'. citet:eioit %%a., in effect that a trn.-t colnotes duties
and iowers: and tiha if tl:e dtiiv!. fai i,,r '\ant of tne one to enforce
tm. the rlit fails as a tr't. hut the tatisets rellain as optional powers.
I'rofes-or (,rav di-approvcI o; th:-a.L. -. :. m ee Gray. Powers in Trust
and ;if,, Implied in Ih.'aul; of Apoit:tlentili. . llarv. L. Rev. i. Was
no rrote-. r S'r;,v 4:n..Lal ioilltelc-, 1y his dt-ire to a'oid the teces-
sity of recognizing any tinle-rule except the rule against perpetuities?
".iZ H arv. L Re\. 2 l: Rule against Perjietuities (.d Ed.). Sec. 8!)7.
Profes.or (;ray s that iH the tru-t i4 created 11" a con eyance inter
vw,,s, It is p.-Mlje to regard the transaction as a mandate, valid until
re .oked: ;id that iti -o;ie C. .s it i- p,s.- :le to .-pell out a contract between
the .ettlor and the trutcc-, or. if :everal persons contribute, a contract
between the contr~itiors. Butt he contends that an attempted trust by will
for a non-charitable unincorporated society can be avoided by the heirs
ir next of kin of the testator.
"Maitland. Collected Papers. 11. 271-284. 32-1-404. "The trust has
gilen u. a liberal sul,-titute for a law ab ut personified institutions. The
tru.-t has gihen its a liberal supplement for a necessarily meagre law of
corporations." Op. cit. 279.
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in property. Courts of law to a limited extent have recognized
such associations, but equity has given them ample countenance.
There is no difficulty in enforcing such trusts as these, for even
though all the members of the association have no right to insist
on a distribution of its property among them, yet any member
should have a right to file a bill in equity to compel the trustees
to carry out the trust. Such trusts, therefore, have sometimes
been upheld.10 Austin lVakcmapt Scott.
Harvard Law School.
(To be Confiued)
"is re Drummond (1914), 2 C. go. See an article on The Legal Status
of a College Fraternity Chapter, 42 Amer. L. Rev. 168, ifo.
